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ABSTRACT
Design research perspectives may have a great deal of insights to offer
emergency response researchers. We consider man-made and natural disasters
as events that often require rapid change to existing institutionalized technical,
social, and cultural support structure—a fundamental problem for static systems.
Built infrastructure such as electric power and telecommunications or emergency
response systems such as fire, police, and National Guard all have static
information systems that are tailored to their specific needs. These specialized
systems are typical of those developed as a result of applying traditional
information systems design theory. They are designed to control domain specific
variables and mitigate a specific class of constraints derived from a wellarticulated environment with firm application boundaries. Therefore, typical
mission-critical Information and Communication Infrastructure (ICTI)
technologies empower knowledge workers with the ability to change current
environmental events to ensure safety and security. Disasters create situations
that are challenging for typical designs because a disaster erodes control and
raises unexpected constraints during an emerging set of circumstances. The
unpredictable circumstances of disasters demonstrate that current emergency
response ICTI systems are ill equipped to rapidly evolve in concert to address the
full scale and scope of such complex problems. A phenomenon found in the
treatment of trauma victims, the Golden Trauma Time Interval, is generalized in
this paper to all emergencies in order to inform designers of the next generation
Murray Turoff and Bartel Van de Walle acted as senior editors for this paper.
Klashner, R. and S. Sabet, “Designing Malleable Cyberinfrastructure to Breach the Golden Barrier,”
Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 6:3, 2004, 59-84.

Robb Klashner and Sameh Sabet

ICTI. This future ICTI or “Cyberinfrastructure” can provide the essential
foundation necessary to dynamically adapt conventional ICTI into a
configuration suitable for use during disasters. However, Cyberinfrastructure
will suffice only if it can be sufficiently evolved as an Integrated Information
Infrastructure (I3 ) that addresses the common sociotechnical factors in these
domains. This paper describes fundamental design concepts derived from
interdisciplinary theoretical constructs used to inform the creation of a
framework to model “complex adaptive systems” (CAS) of which emergency
response infrastructural systems and I3 are instances. In previous work, CAS
was synthesized with software architecture concepts to arrive at a design
approach for the electric power grid’s I3. We will present some of the
foundational concepts of CAS that are useful for the future design and
development of a Cyberinfrastructure. The ICTI may exist today in a raw form to
accomplish the task, but further ICTI design research is required to pinpoint
critical inhibitors to its evolution. Also, social, organizational, and institutional
issues pertaining to this research will be highlighted as emergency response
system design factors needing further consideration. For example, this discussion
infers a resolution to the basic tradeoff between personal privacy rights and
public safety.

INTRODUCTION
The inability to deliver the appropriate
data and information to specific knowledge
workers during or immediately following a
disaster often results in the needless loss of
human life. We assert this inability to respond
is tightly coupled with the inappropriate
methods and techniques used to design the
Information and Communication Technologies
Infrastructure (ICTI) that the key agents utilize.
In order to develop better methodologies,
design researchers could benefit from a
different
theoretical
framework
when
attempting to solve the problems presented in
this paper. This research juxtaposes some very
general constructs such as communication and
control within the context of large disasters in
order to show that there is a diminishing
emergency response capability to respond due
to inadequate and/or inappropriate ICTI
designed using conventional information
system theories. Issues associated with
organizational forms, institutional forces,
privacy, and freedom of the citizenry further
convolute this examination of emergency
response capabilities. These general constructs
and issues typically interact, resulting in
certain common systemic behavior that we
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describe using trauma emergencies, electric
power blackouts, and examination of a
possible real-world scenario (given today’s
independent technological developments). We
address this lack of appropriate design
approaches by presenting a broad theoretical
framework that has been synthesized from
existing research and observed phenomena.
The framework can be used for complex
sociotechnical problems.
Disasters are man-made or natural
events that disrupt normal operations of the
existing technical, social, and cultural support
structure such as built infrastructure and
emergency response. These events often
require that the existing information
infrastructure be rapidly interfaced so that
agencies not accustomed to working together
can now share information. Examples of these
complex tasks include the integration of
information systems (IS) supporting the supply
chain for the first Gulf War or the coordination
and interaction between NYC utilities after 911. Built infrastructure such as the intermodal
transportation system, electric power grid,
natural
gas
system,
Internet,
or
telecommunications networks all have robust
underlying information infrastructure that is
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separate from the other infrastructural systems.
Emergency response systems such as fire,
police, and National Guard usually have well
established IS that are tailored to their specific
needs, but are also difficult to interface
together if the disaster requires such a
reconfiguration. Disasters present new design
challenges because conventional requirements
are often not applicable due to changing
domain specific constraints. The unforeseen
behavior of a disaster tends to erode control
and raise unexpected constraints during an
emerging set of circumstances that are only
partially known in advance.

Current emergency response systems
that were designed using a traditional IS
design notion of firm system boundaries are ill
equipped to rapidly evolve in concert with
other IS. These specialized ICTI systems are
typical of those developed as a result of
applying traditional information systems
design theory as described by (Walls,
Widmeyer and El Sawy 1992). Walls et al.
“used the name ‘IS design theories’ to refer to
an integrated prescription consisting of a
particular class of user requirements, a type of
system solution (with distinctive features), and
a set of effective development practices. Thus,
there are design theories for familiar system

CONTRIBUTIONS
This interdisciplinary design research is guided by a Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)
framework. We use the framework to synthesize disparate concepts in a new approach to
inform Emergency Response infrastructural systems researchers about design approaches
intended to reduce complexity associated with many real-world development efforts. Design
research can be an effective perspective on real-world systems associated with emergencies.
These design research approaches include the analysis of Information and Communication
Technology Infrastructure (ICTI) artifacts in order to explain, extend, and/or evolve their
behavior. The goal of such analysis is to guide current ICTI towards a more robust
sociotechnical instantiation such as an Integrated Information Infrastructure (I3) and/or a
technologically advanced and interconnected version of ICTI (i.e., a futuristic
Cyberinfrastructure). Design research is typically interdisciplinary due to the artifact being
researched to investigate complex problems. Generally, design research begins with problem
articulation. This paper’s primary thrust, structure, and contribution are the articulation of a
complex emergency response related problem in terms of the CAS theoretical framework not
previously associated with phenomena from various mission-critical domains.
The paper informs the reader how to conceptualize an extremely large design research
project; such as I3 based on sociotechnical constraints arising from powerful stakeholders and
resulting in ambiguous high-level requirements. We demonstrate how to draw together various
streams of research within the CAS framework in order to structure the problem arising from a
particular emergency response phenomenon— the Golden Trauma Time Interval (GTTI). The
GTTI phenomenon is the concept that during an emergency, a small window of opportunity
exists in which a trauma victim can be saved if appropriate medical attention is provided. The
obstruction preventing the utilization of needed resources to avert tragedy is referred to as the
“Golden Barrier” among emergency personnel. Although coined specifically for medical
emergencies, this concept may also be generalized to all emergency situations. The paper
articulates the general case of the phenomenon as a problem that can be somewhat addressed
through the next generation of I3 as a Cyberinfrastructure design.
This research contributes to community knowledge by walking through the steps
necessary to articulate the problem, namely theory justification, suggestions for method
development, and a future scenario as a mechanism to crystallize aspects of the theory and
methodological analysis. An architectural approach was leveraged in order to show the full
cohesive process involved in problem development and articulation. Without this deep
understanding of design research, many less experienced researchers would not discover the
correct or valid problem to solve.
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types, like DSS [Decision Support Systems],
TPS [Transaction Processing Systems], EIS
[Executive Information Systems], etc.”
(Markus, Majchrzak and Les Gasser 2002).
These types of information systems are the
result of system analysis practices that
generate narrowly bounded requirements and
solutions. Per the resulting requirements, they
were designed to control domain specific
variables and mitigate a specific class of
constraints derived from a well-articulated
environment. An empirical study (Curtis,
Krasner and Iscoe 1988) of 17 large software
design projects revealed:
•

Deep domain-specific knowledge
applicable to early analysis and design
phases was woefully lacking,

•

Fluctuating or conflicting system
requirements always cause problems, and

•

Communication and coordination
breakdowns often constrain project
success.

In addition, their data and behavioral
study indicated the actual implementation (e.g.,
“writing code”) was not a problem, but
“understanding the problem is the problem”
(Curtis, Krasner and Iscoe 1988). These
insights agree with software engineering
perspectives and problem articulation research
in decision sciences (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther
and Shoemaker 1993). Therefore, more
theoretically grounded research is needed to
address the myriad of technical, social,
psychological, and cultural issues surrounding
the development and deployment of ICTI
systems. Also, these ICTI systems must be
designed malleable due to unexpected domain
constraints. But, software is notoriously
“brittle” and prone to failure when configured
into large systems.
We generally believe if critical design
issues can be effectively addressed that
emerging ICTI will facilitate better utilization
of the knowledge gained from the analysis of
phenomena such as those we present later in
this paper. We present the following vision as
a focal point for the reader to keep in mind.
Vision statement: Emergency personnel
are knowledge workers who will continue
to rely on real-time information, their
intuitive understanding of the domain, and
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advanced technology in order to reduce
risk for the public and mitigate loss of life.
In the future, these knowledge workers
will know you (or your spouse, your
children, your parents, your friends) have
entered a life-threatening situation the
moment the threat arises—no matter
where you (they) are in the world.
The technology appears to be almost
prepared so that technologists can offer the
world this option as the following quote
supporting
the
development
of
“Cyberinfrastructure” indicates:
The combination of wireless LANs, the
third generation of cellular phones,
satellites, and the increasing use of
unlicensed wireless bands will cover the
world with connectivity enabling both
scientific research and emergency
preparedness to utilize a wide variety of
“sensornets”. Building on advances in
micro-electronic mechanical systems
(MEMS) and nanotechnology, smart
sensors can be deployed widely, will be
capable of multiple types of detection, and
can survive for long periods of time. The
integration of real-time multisensor data
with data mining across large distributed
data archives opens further avenues for
adaptive
monitoring/observation,
situational awareness, and emergency
response. (Atkins et al. 2003)
However, it remains to be seen if the
social,
cultural,
organizational,
and
institutional barriers can be overcome to
leverage the technology when it is actually
ready. This paper attempts to articulate some
of the inhibitors as we search for an accurate
problem definition(s).
There is a need to take advantage of the
opportunity provided by these emerging
technologies. New design approaches should
help capture value from these emerging
technologies if the appropriate research can be
done. This revelation is being recognized
throughout
scientific
and
engineering
communities, which is evidenced by the U.S.
National Science Foundation Design Science
solicitation for grant proposals (NSF 2004).
Having such an infrastructure that allows for
immediate response to emergencies and
therefore results in fewer human lives loss is
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indeed a valuable safety net. However, what
would you trade for that safety net? Would
you trade your privacy, money, and/or
freedom? Because these systems could easily
be used for evil as well as good, what ethical
mandate should accompany the scientific
investigation of these technologies? These are
complex and highly controversial questions,
which this paper will only partially augment.
The critical design research questions we
examine in this paper at some length are more
manageable. How can one design complex
systems:
1.

to mitigate the impacts of the phenomena
associated with emergency events; i.e., the
Golden Barrier?

2.

to conform to a myriad of organizational,
institutional, social, and technical domainspecific constraints?

3.

with an enhanced, if not full, awareness of
domain forces arising from crosscutting
effects?

4.

to mollify the complexities associated
with wicked infrastructural problems?

We will point out in the next section
that the trauma and electric power data
indicates there is a temporal correlation
between emergency response and the eventual
consequences incurred. In addition, we are
asserting that the solution to the
Cyberinfrastructure design problem must
factor in numerous dynamic constraints to be
correct. Then we elaborate the problem in
more depth to present the multifaceted design
considerations that force an examination of a
broader theory than currently available to IS
designers. The theoretical considerations are
enumerated in the Theory section through the
presentation of a Complex Adaptive Systems
(CAS) theoretical framework. The CAS
framework is useful to reduce systemic
complexity by facilitating the integration of
various cross-disciplinary research into a
cohesive whole. The related research that has
been integrated for this work is then presented
to further demonstrate the CAS utility and
cross-functionality. Characteristics of a
plausible method to match the theoretical
framework are presented briefly to substantiate
the theory’s possible research applicability. To
connect our Vision Statement, aforementioned
phenomena, theory, and real problems,

emergency medical services are contextualized
with some historical background prior to
presenting a brief design example. This
futuristic emergency response scenario is used
to piece together the puzzle formed by
communication, control, GTTI, infrastructure,
architecture, and generic emergency events
through a Cyberinfrastructure analysis
premised on the previously suggested method.
The case also draws out salient issues
confounded with morals and ethics that must
be addressed when designing systems through
the weighing of human life and personal
freedoms or privacy. The paper will then be
summarized and the final section will lay out
recommendations for future research and
conclusions.

ELABORATING ON THE PROBLEM
The domain drives the choice of theory
in our research because of the strong influence
domain constraints have on the evolution of
ICTI with respect to mission-critical
infrastructure. In this case, built or urban
infrastructure is the primary domain constraint
since it has to be evolved due to economic
constraints and cannot be simply replaced.
Markus further points out that the expanded
meaning of infrastructure is “the structure
within” (Markus 1984). Therefore, when her
definition is applied to organizational systems,
the term refers to “both tangible equipment,
staff and applications and the intangible
organization, methods and policies by which
the organization maintains its ability to
provide system services” (page 148) implying
an inseparable relationship. The Markus
definition is very consistent with field
observations in energy utilities (Klashner 2002)
and Reddy’s observation of trauma centers
(Reddy, Dourish and Pratt 2001). In order to
further demonstrate these domain drivers and
symbiotic organizational relationships, certain
domain phenomena will be presented next that
shows a level of organized complexity, which
will be revisited later, in the theory section.

DOMAIN SPECIFIC PHENOMENA
The loss of system control often
coincides with the erosion of system structure
creating a set of phenomena associated with an
emergency event. Several large missioncritical infrastructural systems and emergency
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appropriate medical attention is provided.
This concept of a Golden Trauma Time
Interval is further elaborated in Figure 1
(CWDMG
2003).
This
temporal
window—the GTTI—is of the gravest
importance. However, much of the GTTI
is wasted in locating the victim and initial
analysis. Therefore, this barrier is
“golden” because it greatly influences the
severity of the event. Note how the lack of
information and attention drastically
changes the severe trauma scenario and
the outcome of the GTTI event in Figure 1.
Notification of the occurrence of an
incident and attention to the appropriate
resource allocation are literally the
difference between life and death. Of all
trauma victims, approximately 30-50%
perish due to lack of timely care or
appropriate technology during a given
GTTI when it is required. So, to what
degree does societal dependency on the
control infrastructure, and the emergency
response system structure contribute to
higher than necessary fatalities? It is
difficult to say because of scarcity of data
due to its sensitive nature (i.e., medical,

response
industries
share
certain
characteristics that are tied to the lack of
accurate information delivered in a timely
fashion. To further ground this discussion, we
present concrete real-world cases before
continuing with the theoretical research
aspects of this paper.
Severe Trauma
“’The first 60 minutes following an
accident largely dictate whether a
critically injured person will live or die.’
Dr. R Adams Cowley (Cowley 1976) the
pioneering Maryland trauma surgeon, is
often credited with coining the term, ‘The
Golden Hour of Trauma’. It is important
to realize that he did not mean that a
discreet 60 minute time interval elapses
from the time of injury until the onset of
irreversible shock or death.” (CWDMG
2003)
We assert the properties of the GTTI
are common to all sizable emergency response
situations.
A small window of opportunity exists in
which a trauma victim can be saved if
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Figure 1. The Visual Representation of the Golden Trauma Time Interval (GTTI)
Phenomenon
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national security, etc.). However, what is even
more compelling is that the GTTI phenomenon
can be generalized to most man-made and
natural disasters. Generally, the GTTI
phenomenon can be attributed to the same
control-structure dynamic observed in the
electric power grid (described below). It is
therefore important to examine this
relationship further.
Electric Power Domain
The electric power industry evolved
over the last century and its integrated
information infrastructure (I3) (Klashner 2002)
is the culmination of four decades of evolution.
The real time, mission-critical, and ubiquitous
characteristics of this industry magnify domain
complexity arising from the sheer size of the
system. For example, electric power grid
operators control the flow of electricity over
thousands of square miles and to millions of
customers. Both antiquated and cutting edge
technologies coexist and interact to provide the
necessary
services
through
I3.
The
3
development and operation of I for the
electric power industry establishes a distinct
domain of interest. Interactions between
domain entities and I3 result in domainspecific system behavior. In other words, the
electric power grid behaves in a particular
manner because of the I3 it is utilizing, which
includes the social and intangible ramifications
inferred in the Markus definition of
infrastructure. The electric power domain is
very complex necessitating the use of complex
research tools to gain intellectual leverage over
the problem’s breadth and depth. The I3
designer often uses an abstraction such as
architecture to gain intellectual control over
complex domain data. There exists a natural
relationship between the concepts of
infrastructure and architecture, which often
have a great deal of design overlap, socially
constrained juncture, or even common
physical components. A great number of
various architectural abstractions exist, but
software architectures are particularly relevant
for developing I3 (Klashner 2002). The high
architectural level of abstraction coincides
with the view of the electric power grid system
from the grid dispatch center—their command
and control center. As one informant at grid
dispatch phrased it, they have the “view from
30,000 feet” (Klashner 2002).

The electric power grid is typically very
stable in the US; i.e., a normal state of
economic dispatch. However, the electric
power grid does experience state changes. A
state change event in electric power would be
a power line fault or generator malfunctioning,
which would effectively change the grid
frequency. When system faults occur, the grid
state changes to a brownout (i.e. reduced
voltage or supply pattern for a geographical
area) or blackout (i.e. complete loss of voltage
for a given area). The large blackout in the
Western United States in 1995 was physically
the result of harmonics building up in the grid
system over a period of several weeks. A
series of unforeseen circumstances and events
in the mountain states rapidly escalated the
situation until a fault caused by a tree touching
a high-voltage wire started a cascading failure.
The rolling failure lasting a few minutes
created a brownout condition throughout the
West Coast and complete blackout in Arizona.
However, the blackout had social and political
causes as well as technical causes. Grid
dispatch experts often understand the nature of
an emergency through intuition. But
deregulation has confused their traditional
domain understanding and diluted the
effectiveness of their organizational memory
by
introducing
additional
high-level
abstractions
and
ambiguity
primarily
associated with the politics of electric power,
thereby making the problem even more
intractable.
Prior to the 2003 blackout in the
Northeast United States, the electric power
grid began behaving irregularly indicating
electric power grid operators were losing
control of the system (Ellis 2003). The final
report by the joint U.S. and Canadian task
force investigating the blackout determined the
“Loss of Eastlake 5, however, did not initiate
the blackout. Rather, subsequent computer
failures leading to the loss of situational
awareness in FE’s [FirstEnergy] control room
and the loss of key FE transmission lines due
to contacts with trees were the most important
causes” (Ellis 2003).
This lack of “situational awareness”, in
both the West Coast and Northeast blackouts,
is effectively the capability of command and
control personnel to manage knowledge based
on a plethora of continuously replenished
information and data, which is delivered to
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their control center via the ICTI. As a direct
result of these failures, large geographical
regions disconnected and/or had voltage
collapse coinciding with the rapid erosion of
the grid structure. The dependence on ICTI
(i.e., no manual mechanisms) and the absence
of appropriate sensors in conjunction with a
shared knowledge base contributed to these
blackouts. These factors combine to work
against the command and control personnel.
In addition to proactive situational awareness
to prevent emergencies, similar ICTI
mechanisms should be applied reactively to
any emergency response situation.

MULTIFACETED DESIGN
CONSIDERATIONS
There is a great deal of overlap between
the concepts of a Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins
et al. 2003) and the earlier I3 conceptualization,
but Cyberinfrastructure as presented by Atkins
et al neglects some of the concerns voiced by
Klashner such as the inclusion of the Markus
intangibles. Therefore, we have chosen to
expand the definition of Cyberinfrastructure
here to include aspects of I3 to demonstrate the
utility of having more degrees of freedom with
respect to sociocultural aspects of information
infrastructure
design.
Thus,
our
Cyberinfrastructure design recommendations
will be augmented with some of the
foundational concepts used in I3 design. The
general research we are proposing to address
the aforementioned questions should focus
design on both Cyberinfrastructure and I3
conceptual issues because a critical
intersection between the concepts revolves
around
the
nontechnical
aspects
of
requirements for these systems. In both
instances, a variety of domain constraints
translate into somewhat intractable, but
important “high-level requirements” that
directly effect design considerations. To make
this point more salient, we introduce the
research by King (King et al. 1994; Forster
and King 1995; Pickering and King 1995;
King, Grinter and Pickering 1997) into "highlevel requirements analysis.”
King et al focus on issues of
organizational and institutional usability that
have created difficulties for software designers
and software developers. The problem inherent
in the design of complicated sociotechnical
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information infrastructures is that they must
function effectively in complex organizational
and institutional settings. Their research of
high-level requirements is set in highly
institutionalized production sectors that are
affected in dramatic ways by the regulatory
and influential efforts of social institutions,
both formal (e.g., Federal policy-makers), and
informal (e.g., professional associations).
Infrastructural systems investigated by King et
al include: control of electric power generation,
transmission, and distribution resources in
deregulated markets; communication IS for
intermodal logistics and transport; signaling
and addressing systems in global commoncarrier wireless networks; case management
systems in criminal courts; patient record
systems in health care; systems for curricular
education in "distance learning" in higher
education. Baldwin states the problem of
business strategies and government policies
designs for innovation and technology in the
following manner:
Compounding this problem is the fact that
many social scientists, business leaders
and policy makers misunderstand the
nature of designs and design processes in
fundamental ways. For example, many
believe that the process of creating a large,
complex design is rational, orderly, and
deterministic. Designers and others close
to the actual processes know that such
processes are creative, messy, and have
highly uncertain outcomes. It is a fact that
uncertain and open-ended processes
require radically different institutions,
organizations and incentives from
deterministic processes: the factory
approach will not work for designs.
(Baldwin 2003)
The
compounding
of
domain
constraints and high-level requirements, as
noted above, interact in a complex manner
resulting in a “wicked problem”(Rittel and
Webber 1973). Wicked problems do not have
solutions, only best possible resolutions. This
complexity is especially apparent in the area of
command and control center design (Klashner
2002) where emergencies must be resolved
based on large quantities of data interpreted by
experts.
These concepts can be summarized as
follows: External domain and internal
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structural
constraints
interact
through
organizational and institutional associations
resulting in high-level requirements that often
lead to system development failure. The
situation is further confounded in missioncritical infrastructural domains required for
emergency response wherein the design of
information systems infrastructure necessary
to operate is obfuscated by social factors not
easily explicated by traditional IS or software
engineering design approaches that focus on
an application domain. The interplay across
these concepts throughout the infrastructure
also create crosscutting effects that surface as
domain considerations and must be resolved
during architectural and/or design decisionmaking depending on the scope or level of
system
abstraction.
Drawing
arbitrary
application domain boundaries or creating
abstract models in order to exclude these
crosscutting effects results in the creation of
more complex problems that must be
addressed later in the evolution of the system.
This dynamic was observed in the deregulation
of the US electric power industry (Klashner
2002; Klashner 2004). This is especially true
in California where over $20 billion was lost
due to inappropriate deregulatory efforts
founded on a particularly flawed IS design
exploited by Enron (Swartz 2003). Therefore,
this sort of “wicked” problem (Rittel and
Webber 1973) can be attacked in a broad
Cyberinfrastructure/I3 design context. In
answering the research questions presented
earlier, this paper further articulates all of the
prior aspects as a “wicked” design problem in
order to enumerate some of the more tangible
constraints and tradeoffs. We elaborate on an
initial Cyberinfrastructure design theoretical
framework in the next section that we envision
as necessary to provide emergency response
capabilities to society.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The general problem in the prior
section noted how organizational, institutional,
social, and technical crosscutting effects
complicate already difficult mission-critical
infrastructure
design
problems.
These
infrastructures are necessary for emergency
preparedness and response. These difficulties
necessitate the use of theory to provide
guidance throughout complex design tasks
inherent within the wicked problem of

designing ICTI to address such phenomena as
the Golden Barrier. Typical information
systems are already a critical component of all
mission-critical infrastructures. The integration
of IS infrastructure to form the ubiquitous
nature of Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins et al.
2003) create design difficulties for IS
researchers. In the past, application definitions
and boundaries were imposed in order to gain
intellectual mastery over the complexity in the
problem domain (Walls, Widmeyer and El
Sawy 1992). That is, ‘IS design theories’ as
defined by Walls et al adhere to a particular
class of user requirements, and a type of
system solution (e.g., DSS, TPS, EIS) in order
to assure success, defining away the problem
complexity
through
specific
conceptualizations. However, even if these
conceptualizations helped designers, the true
high-level requirements are obscure (as noted
above), and since the problems are “wicked”
there is no absolute solution. So, traditional IS
design theories do not provide representational
sufficiency or intellectual mastery over the
problems and are not generally applicable to
Cyberinfrastructure designs.
There exists a strong correlation
between the complexity of built infrastructure
design, the domain, and the apparent
wickedness of the problem. In other words, the
role of the environment should be considered
when assessing the impacts of complexity on
the design. Definitions of complexity (e.g.,
Santa Fe Institute versions) often include
convoluted mathematical descriptions of little
practical benefit to IS designers. Other
definitions utilize controversial or abstruse
notions such as postmodernism (Cilliers 1998).
Complexity experts feel that a precise
definition of complexity is unlikely in the near
future (Axelrod and Cohen 2000). Some
descriptions of domain complexity are
primarily concerned with sociocultural
domains; e.g., Jackson's “informal” domain
(Jackson 1995). Also, apparent complex entity
behavior over time does not necessarily have a
direct causal association with internal entity
complexity (Simon 1995). To make this point
about environment, Simon describes the semirandom path an ant would follow on the beach
resulting from domain interdependencies
(pages 63-66). We believe his illustration is
somewhat analogous to sociocultural domain
constraints guiding the design of infrastructure
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through
policy-making.
The
resulting
convoluted design is not an engineering
derivative, but a product of the sociotechnical
political process.
The scale and scope of these design
difficulties necessitates the utilization of
theory that has an intellectual foundation
capable of managing all aspects of
sociocultural complexity, wicked problem
definition, and behavioral diversity. Leveson
argues that science and engineering were
making good progress toward a science of
design up until the late 1970s and early 1980s,
but have “started all going down one narrow
path…without much regard for complexity,
intellectual manageability, or many of the
principles derived in the 70’s” (Leveson 2003).
She further asserts that a science of design
“must” include “understanding the many
aspects of complexity; go beyond simple
hierarchical decomposition and create design
principles and concepts based on systems
theory [emphasis added], including the
principle of emergence; and explore such
topics as the relationship between human
cognitive
limits
(intellectual
manageability)…” To address these same
difficulties found in the electric power industry,
Klashner utilized a theoretical framework for
sociocultural systems (Buckley 1967; Buckley
1998), which was strongly influenced by
general systems theory. The framework was
developed to model “complex adaptive
systems” (CAS) and had been derived from
several disciplines. Klashner synthesized CAS
and software architecture concepts to arrive at
a design approach for the electric power grid’s
integrated information infrastructure (Klashner
2002). We will present some of the
foundational concepts of CAS below for later
use in the presentation of Cyberinfrastructure
design method recommendations.
The “modern systems theorists” from
the 1950s and 1960s had tightly coupled the
concepts of organization, information, control,
and communication (all of which will be
enumerated in the following case). The
environment can be viewed as a "set” or
“ensemble" of elements, states, or events that
are to some degree distinguishable based on
spatial relations, temporal relations, or
properties
(Buckley
1967).
These
distinguishable differences are generally
regarded as "variety". Buckley extended those
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peculiar organizational concepts to assert that
CAS elements were almost entirely linked by
the intercommunication of information rather
than through some other mechanism, such as
energy or inherent structure, as with many
other popular sociological approaches of his
time. The term "organized complexity"
(Buckley 1967) (pp 38); which he extracted
from (Rapoport and Horvath 1959), to define a
"collection of entities interconnected by a
complex net of relations". Within the
framework, every entity has some degree of
organization—albeit relative—that lie between
two organizational extremes represented by
the ideal constructs presented next.
The first construct is called “organized
simplicity”. Organized simplicity "is a
complex of relatively unchanging components
linked by a strict sequential order or linear
additivity, without closed loops in the causal
chain."
Buckley’s
second
extreme
organizational
construct
is
“chaotic
complexity”. Chaotic complexity refers to "a
vast number of components that do not have to
be specifically identified and whose
interactions can be described in terms of
continuously distributed quantities or gradients,
as in statistical mechanics." In other words,
Buckley constructs a continuum wherein all
conceptual definitions of organization may fall.
The continuum formed between
organized simplicity and organized complexity
as endpoints was synthesized by Buckley with
the help of Norbert Wiener’s (Wiener 1956)
“notion” of “contingency” (pp 82). This
combination of an organizational continuum
and contingency introduces dynamism by
integrating complex adaptive organization into
preexisting theory. In other words, if all things
are necessary and nothing is contingent, no
significant concept of organization can be
arrived at, but with contingency comes degrees
of organization lying between organized
simplicity and chaotic complexity. Based on
(Ashby 1962), Buckley also asserted relatively
stable spatial, causal, and/or temporal relations
between elements or events are considered to
be "constraints". Chaotic complexity is
complete lack of constraint and organized
simplicity is the presence of maximum
constraint.
Typically,
stable
causal
relationships exhibit a high degree of
constraint.
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The third key concept, in addition to
“contingency” and “constraint” used by
Buckley to explicate complex organization, is
“degrees of freedom in the interrelation of
parts” (pp. 83). When no freedom of choice
exists, the system is in a state of maximal
organization. Inversely, when complete or
absolute freedom of choice exists a state of
systemic chaos exists. So, constraint and
degrees of freedom are dynamic constructs
that describe a complex adaptive systems’
relation to a changing set of contingencies.
This dynamic results in the organizational state
of the system that informs the designers of
information systems during the integration
activities, which are representative of CAS
evolution. Designers seek to maximize their
control of this process by maximizing their
understanding of the current set of available
contingencies, constraints, and degrees of
freedom at their disposal in order to reduce
risk. IS designers are thus seeking as much
relevant information as possible, which is
important for another aspect of CAS.
Buckley connects the aforementioned
organizational concepts to a type of
information
theory
that
provides
a
“generalized logical framework for the
discussion of symbolic intercommunication”
(pp. 84); i.e., it is not of the signal coding and
transmission type. Generally, an information
theory starts with a set of continuous signals,
symbols, or messages generated by a source in
various patterns. When maximal organization
exists, no variety is present, which is the same
as negative entropy per Buckley’s analysis of
information theory. If environmental “variety”
exists, it must be converted into information in
order to have meaning for the receiving entity
(e.g., the IS designer). The conversion process
includes recognizing and selecting a subset of
the variety, then "mapping" the environmental
variety and constraints into its own organized
structure and/or information. For example,
living creatures acquire, organize, and
incorporate information that facilitates their
survival in particular environments through
genetic alteration during evolution. Therefore,
part of the receiving entity and the
environment become isomorphic with respect
to the subset of variety that is freely chosen
during evolution. This process is basically
communication of the original variety and its
associated constraints in a manner that remains

somewhat invariant between transmitting and
receiving elements (Buckley 1998).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
SUMMARY AND APPLICABILITY TO
EMERGENCIES
CAS has been briefly described using a
behavioral sociocultural framework developed
by Buckley in order to facilitate its
applicability to emergency situations. Since
Buckley’s work was a synthesis of a large
body of interdisciplinary research that mapped
into the General Systems umbrella, only the
essence of the CAS framework has been
presented. The essence of this design
framework applies to complex systems
wherein a set or ensemble of elements, states,
or events are distinguished based on variety
associated with spatial and temporal relations
through concepts of information, control, and
communication within an organizational
continuum bounded by organized simplicity
and chaotic complexity. Ensemble or set
members also have properties of varying types
that contribute to their ability to be contingent
or to constrain other systemic elements, states,
or events within given interrelated degrees of
freedom, thereby factoring into organizational
state. The CAS framework can guide the
utilization of other broadly or narrowly
defined theories and methods because it is an
“integrationist” framework (Burrell and
Morgan 1979) developed to research emergent
phenomenon. For example, to draw out
diverging aspects of co-located missioncritical infrastructure one may choose to utilize
discourse as a methodological tool (Ulrich
2001) to tease out integration issues and
further specify meanings associated with terms
such as information since Ulrich relies on
rigorous semiotic approaches.
Emergent circumstances are reflected
in the GTTI phenomenon described earlier
wherein control-structure relationships are
critical. Large systems such as infrastructure
or networks of emergency response resources
have extensive stand-alone IS that can be
separately evolved under normal situations
using conventional IS design theory (Walls,
Widmeyer and El Sawy 1992). Although we
agree with a great deal of what Gasson
asserted (e.g., much of design science is
currently misplacing the emphasis on arbitrary
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objectives) (Gasson 2003), we disagree that
“sociocultural
work
and
technologyinteraction are incommensurable” because
CAS is fundamentally a sociocultural
theoretical perspective we have found to
resonate with many technical design
perspectives such as the software architecture
process metaphors (Klashner 2002). Thus, the
CAS theoretical perspective permits reuse of
specialized theories such as DSS, EIS, etc.
within the conceptual framework for normal
design and evolution. Institutional or social
stimuli (e.g., deregulation of the electric power
industry or a large-scale terrorist act) creates
the need to rapidly integrate these systems into
a cohesive whole to adapt the general system
for the emergency situation(s) at hand. The
typical IS theory is not equipped for that sort
of dynamic integration because it is not the
status quo. Using CAS as the theoretical
design framework, one would reinterpret the
status quo as existing systemic constraints
arising from institutionalized entities and
process maintaining maximal organization by
exerting legitimate power to control the degree
of freedom of choice with respect to the set of
possible contingency states.
We propose designing emergency
response systems within the CAS theoretical
framework in a manner that they will not be
abandoned during an emergency, but instead
evolve dynamically based on the emergent
phenomenon represented by the variety
received via the dispersed infrastructural or
emergency network nodes. We concur with
Turoff that for IS to be beneficial and utilized
during an emergency it must be a version of
the systems used on a daily basis (Turoff,
Chumer, Van de Walle, and Yao 2004), but
must also be able to dynamically evolve into
an integrated form with other IS in order to
effectively manage event variety. The next
section describes some basic building blocks
that were derived by Klashner from the CAS
framework (Klashner 2002) we will utilize to
present possible methods.

RELATED RESEARCH
The related work presented in this
section adds concepts, background, and
information from several disciplines for use
within the CAS framework. Since the problem
is “wicked” (Rittel and Webber 1973) and the
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domain complex, triangulation of related
research is intended to facilitate an
understanding of the general systems
theoretical underpinning from which CAS was
derived. This related work would also be
needed to fully understand the scenario
presented later. In addition, several of the
more technical research concepts were
synthesized into CAS (Klashner 2002) in order
to map the CAS principles into a software tool
for use by stakeholders such as IS designers,
software architects, and nontechnical agents in
the electric power industry.
Mission-critical built infrastructure
such as electric power, telecommunications,
and air traffic control rely heavily upon
software and information systems to operate
(Arango 1989; Wets 1991; Denning 1992;
Oreizy, Medvidovic and Taylor 1998; Boehm
and Sullivan 2000; Salasin 2001; Klashner
2002; Markus, Majchrzak and Gasser 2002).
The Internet provides a great deal of capability
such as exemplified when it facilitated the
deregulation of the electric power industry
(FERC 1996), but the Internet is not the
complete solution for all problems (Oreizy,
Medvidovic and Tayler 1998; Boehm and
Sullivan 2000). Integration of technology is
important, such as for Air Traffic Control
(Wets 1991). Satellites orbiting the earth form
an important infrastructure for security and
Global Positioning Systems. However, the
growing dependence on software and
information systems raises concerns about
security vulnerabilities (Boehm and Sullivan
2000). The result is countermeasures such as
the use of cryptography by the US National
Security Agency (Denning 1992). The military
utilizes a wide variety of software
infrastructure for their “Knowledge-centric
Operations”
(Salasin
2001).
Built
infrastructure can be supported with the
appropriate reusable software infrastructure
design (Arango 1989), but enhancing and
propagating these relationships will be the
focus of much research in the future (Atkins et
al. 2003). To evolve the infrastructure through
software component reuse, “a reusable
infrastructure” also needs to be designed
(Oreizy, Medvidovic and Taylor 1998).
The software and information systems
comprising the supporting computational
infrastructure
can
be
architecturally
conceptualized as an Integrated Information
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Infrastructure (I3) (Klashner 2002) or
Cyberinfrastructure (Atkins et al. 2003). “The
newer term cyberinfrastructure refers to
infrastructure based upon distributed computer,
information and communication technology”
(Atkins et al. 2003). The Cyberinfrastructure
can be conceptually abstracted as software
architectures (Tracz 1988; Perry and Wolf
1992) or information system architectures
(Zachman 1987). Depending on the discipline
and level of engagement, architectural
representations
can
capture
business
scope/objectives, business model, elements,
forms, constraints, user functional and
nonfunctional requirements, and abstract
design rationale. The interface with the user is
a significant architectural issue as well (Taylor
and Coutaz 1994; Taylor, Medvidovic,
Anderson, Whitehead and Robbins 1996).
A common means of leveraging the
architectural metaphor is through software
architectural styles that focus on componentconnector abstractions rather than lines of
program code (Tracz 1988; Perry and Wolf
1992). Nontechnical stakeholders can more
easily interpret stylistic views that are
generated based on the captured data. The
Representational State Transfer (REST)
architectural style was used to design the
Internet that “has succeeded in large part
because its software architecture has been
designed to meet the needs…” (Fielding and
Taylor 2002). The C2 architectural style
supports the graphical user interface design
requirements
of
applications
(Taylor,
Medvidovic, Anderson, Whitehead and
Robbins 1996).
Domain Specific Software Architecture
(DSSA) (Tracz, Coglianese and Young 1993;
Taylor, Tracz and Coglianese 1995) grew out
of the recognition that within specific domains
(e.g. fighter aircraft) certain architectural
design considerations are consistent. A DSSA
is typically augmented with reference
architecture and standardized requirements
that are consistently reusable within the
specific domain. The DSSA should be flexible
and extensible to augment future technology.
The DSSA encapsulates and expresses
relationships that facilitate the implemented
system’s tolerance to change. The flow of
control and data are more tightly defined in a
DSSA because of the domain constraints being
multilateral. Temporal events and component

interconnections are described in a DSSA
within a context of legacy systems and
dominant standards for the domain, which
form a constraint set easily mapped within
CAS.
A fundamental CAS concept
necessitates the analysis of domain specific
resources. Therefore, some of the resources
relevant for a Cyberinfrastructure to support
dynamic EMS are enumerated next.
Resources that are conceptualized as
multifunctional equipment are a logical
extension for the scenario presented here,
given the increasingly popular approaches by
firms to make devices multitasking (e.g.
Sony’s PlayStation that plays games and
DVDs). These devices often function in a
control, communication, organizational, or
informational capacity, which is relevant to an
analysis of emergency response systems using
CAS. Domain-specific examples include: a
low-level unconventional CPU design
transfers the decision of what application
algorithm to run from the CPU (Ziavras 2003),
or smart electric power meters communicate
across
the
existing
building
power
infrastructure to collect, store, and transmit
detailed electrical consumption and system
monitoring information using data encryption
(Echelon 2001). Also, JavaTM language
technologies were originally designed for the
“convergence of digitally controlled consumer
devices
and
computers”
(http://java.sun.com/features/1998/05/birthday.
html), but not the wide-scale utilization on the
Internet. However, JavaTM technologies are
now showing dramatic growth (Chen 2004)
and fostering ubiquitous computing for the
software “infrastructure products” (e.g. PDA),
thereby becoming a fundamental enterprise
communication medium (McMillan 2001)
demonstrating the emergent phenomena one
would expect within a CAS (Buckley 1967;
Buckley 1998).
Other examples of “smart appliances”
may include the vehicles we use every day.
The OnStar™ (www.onstar.com) system is
becoming more popular with many car
manufacturers integrating the service in new
vehicles. The system employs a GPS receiver
in the vehicle and a wireless modem and voice
connection. Using the modem, the OnStar call
center can download the exact location of the
vehicle as well as remotely control aspects of
the vehicle (such as unlocking the doors). Self-
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aware information and communication
technology and ubiquitous data collection
implies many larger resource constraint issues
that overlap social concerns. Inferences about
unethical and immoral abuses of resources to
gain or maintain illegitimate power are easily
imaginable. All of these issues must be
considered when creating an architectural
design.

METHODOLOGICAL EXPECTATIONS
The methods described here are a
derivative from CAS and the synthesized
intellectual concepts from the applicable
research just described, since the CAS
framework
integrates
these
diverse
perspectives. Domain variety should be
captured using appropriate quantitative or
qualitative data collection methods. The data is
then classified into constraint types since
constraint is essential to CAS analysis. Note,
the capture and articulation of domain variety
as constraint categories are not the most
difficult aspect of design. Historically,
difficulties typically arise for practitioners
when they attempt to formalize the more
ambiguous constraints found in the socially
oriented categories. We argue the established
intellectual constructs for articulating the more
ambiguous variety can be used to cull out
crosscutting effects spanning constraint
categories, which should be theoretically
applicable to all mission-critical infrastructure
and emergency response networks.
The Cyberinfrastructure designer can
use concrete resource concepts when
categorizing constraints and reasoning about
the interaction of constraints across categories,
which are two conditions for sufficient domain
representation. Concrete resources constraints
arise from stakeholder empowerment within
an objective perspective and vary in density
from physical laws (e.g. E=mc2) to
governmental policy (e.g., FERC NOPR to
deregulate the electric power industry (1996)).
Other “stylistic” constraints are subjective and
tightly
coupled
with
epistemological
constructs used to determine what is
“knowledge” because “Design, in all of its
realizations (e.g., architecture, landscaping, art,
music), has style” (Hevner, March, Park and
Ram 2004). Stylistic views map easily into
typical software and information systems
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architectural abstractions to enable software
tool support.
Generally speaking, any variety or type
of act perpetrated by actors can explain a large
portion of the world. This perspective
facilitates the examination of representational
sufficiency by establishing a consistent
framework across all constraint types. The
“wicked” problem of Cyberinfrastructure
design depends on accurately capturing the
symbiotic relationship already present in the
domain, which is enormous when one
considers built infrastructure such as electric
power. Nevertheless, to design a malleable
Cyberinfrastructure some approach must be
adopted. As noted earlier, we think a Domain
Specific Software Architecture (DSSA) style
(Tracz, Coglianese and Young 1993; Taylor,
Tracz and Coglianese 1995; Klashner 2002)
would facilitate discovering the best “fit”
when considering a solution to the GTTI
problem. The concept of “domain” has been
applied to many different levels of
architectural abstraction (Klashner 2002) such
as operating systems or electric power. This
flexibility can be applied to emergency
response, urban infrastructure, or interacting
ICTI. Reuse was a primary motivation for
establishing DSSA concepts that are intended
to result in a representational sufficient
architectural baseline. Thus, a DSSA style can
be developed to span all constraint categories
to satisfy the theoretical framework. Also, the
DSSA style can be used because infrastructure
is often logically treated in a holistic fashion,
with reusable concepts, that is consistent with
systems theory upon which CAS rests.
The requirements to solve the GTTI
problem are tightly coupled with the breadth
of the problem domain (i.e., anywhere people
inhabit or travel) and the need to have complex
sensornets for a Cyberinfrastructure. To
address this constraint with its crosscutting
effects, we choose to leverage the worldwide
electric power infrastructure because it is
ubiquitous in the sense that electrical voltage
is never too far away from any populated
location. Since electric power mediums can
and will carry data (Echelon 2001), the electric
power grids will effectively become a primary
sensory medium. Therefore, electricity is a
consistent resource to consider for the design
solution.
However,
the
designed
Cyberinfrastructure would integrate a number
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considering the concrete domain
resources in his\her design.
Dependency considerations are
important for:

of
existing
infrastructures
(e.g.
telecommunications). The actual final system
design would include most if not all of the
other built infrastructures, but they have less
scope with respect to proximity to population.
Initial concept drawings of built
architectural structures in architectural
processes are rough and rarely closely
resemble the finished product. These drawings
serve several purposes within the traditional
architectural
process
that
has
been
conceptually leveraged by IS architects
(Zachman 1987) and software architects (Perry
and Wolf 1992; Perry 1997). The strength of
such a process is the enumeration and
negotiation of domain constraints that must be
factored into an effective design. These
approaches are synergistic and complimentary
with IS design research (Hevner, March, Park
and Ram 2004).
The method should allow designers to
capture the essence of the domain in a manner
that is relevant to all stakeholders associated
with a wide variety of resource allocation
issues. The approach is used to produce an
accurate
constraint-based
design
representation of the application domain. It
should be able to sufficiently represent known
domain “states” because of existing
relationship categories that have reflective
validity in past and ongoing domain events.
Stylistic constraints serve to sufficiently
represent crosscutting effects in order to
reduce complexity. Resources, constraints, and
views work in concert to facilitate the dynamic
construction of a new Cyberinfrastructure to
extend or otherwise manipulate the GTTI. We
suggest the following utilization of resources
and
constraints
to
illustrate
design
functionality:
1.

Resources in the form of concrete
constraints associated with technologies
(referenced in the related work section):
a.

The existing and emerging
technologies all create and function
within a path dependent (Liebowitz
and Margolis 1995) paradigm
because of the scale and scope of the
electric power industry.

b.

The Cyberinfrastructure designer
must be cognizant of current and
possible dependencies when

i. Evolutionary or maintenance
requirements
ii. Associations between constraints
that are fundamental to the
architecture
2.

Stylistic constraints:
a.

Are context dependent

b.

Are subjective

c.

Will be elaborated upon later in the
analysis section

d.

Can be viewed as:
i. Domain variety captured as data
that is transformed into
information
ii. Communication carried out
through primary connections (i.e.
fully functional) in contrast to
communication that is ignored,
inferred, or mitigated in some
manner

We describe a small scenario next to
demonstrate how requirements can be elicited
to augment our Vision Statement. The more
tangible and understandable scenario should
also
facilitate
the
development
of
methodologies based on the theoretical
framework.

AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
SCENARIO
This hypothetical scenario is presented
in order to bring together the many individual
concepts presented up to now. The motivation
for this scenario is to demonstrate how a
Cyberinfrastructure would facilitate the
accomplishment of the initial research
questions. This scenario was chosen as much
for its technical variety as for its sociocultural
constraints, which must be considered in
Cyberinfrastructure design using an adaptive
method within the CAS framework. The
scenario described here effectively juxtaposes
current and emerging future technologies with
the temporal constraints arising from the GTTI
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and societal issues such as privacy and
freedom.
As demonstrated in the development of
CAS (Buckley 1967; Buckley 1998), one
cannot arbitrarily restrict the boundaries of a
system for convenience sake because the
systemic behavior arises from the degree of
organizational complexity internally generated
by the system; i.e., not externally imposed by
the designer. We are contending that control
must be maintained in a holistic manner under
the rubric of information interpreted using the
appropriate theoretical constructs. Otherwise,
per CAS, mission-critical systems can quickly
fail as they transform into a state approaching
chaotic organization as noted within the
electric power grid blackout and GTTI
phenomena. The following scenario presents
this balance that must be attained in the design
of Cyberinfrastructure in order to avoid
degradation toward chaos as massive amounts
of domain variety overwhelm conventionally
designed IS.
The scenario must be contextualized,
which is done next with a discussion of the
CAS concepts as they apply to an emergency.
Then, a brief history of a particular emergency
preparedness network is introduced to help
further ground the method presentation and
present
domain-specific
motivational
arguments. A technological component (Smart
Buildings with there associated subtechnologies) is then introduced into the
emergency scenario to demonstrate the pivotal
role a new (architectural) resource can make in
the design of mission-critical infrastructure.
Following this scenario presentation is the
discussion section, which uses the stylistic
method to analyze the emergency response
scenario described below.

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF
EMERGENCIES USING CAS CONCEPTS
When infrastructures or emergency
preparedness networks are operating in a
normal state and maintaining full control of
emerging situations they exhibit a wellorganized behavior. Since they are not being
presented with any new event variety, we can
infer that little new information is gained
during this situation. However, if a severe
emergency event occurs, the source of the
emergency event generates more variety in the
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domain than had been experienced before.
Each entity, such as an electric power grid
dispatch center or a hospital, receives event
messages and interprets the variety based on
their contingency plans, expertise, and IS
support infrastructure (e.g., DSS) in order to
map it into their view of the domain. If the
level of variety increases beyond their ability
to process it, the infrastructure or emergency
preparedness network begins to approach the
chaotic complexity organizational state, which
means they have too much information or
information overload. The normal set of
constraints no longer correctly apply in these
chaotic situations and information systems
designed using traditional methods are often
abandoned in favor of manual methods such as
with electric power grid dispatch centers
during a grid system disturbance leading to a
major electricity blackout (Klashner 2002;
Klashner 2004). Historically, there have been
incidences where analysis of situations (such
as battles during wars or tragedies) indicates
the necessary data and/or information was
available to arrive at an accurate appraisal of
their situation, but the individuals involved did
not receive and/or configure their information
resources. The result was tragic loss of life
because the variety existing in the domain had
not been appropriately identified, processed,
and delivered to the correct legitimate control
entity. Analysis of the data in these cases
shows that there was sufficient statistical
verification of an imminent event, but
individuals
utilizing
separate
systems
processed the crucial knowledge from the
domain variety. Therefore, these individuals
exercised their degree of freedom to choose
appropriate contingency alternatives based on
existing systemic constraints. The incorrect
mapping of the variety resulted in the loss of
human life. Similar examples exist today in
mission-critical infrastructure emergency
events that threaten human life and cost
billions of dollars.

HISTORY AND MOTIVATION FOR A
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC
CYBERINFRASTRUCTURE
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
prior to the 1970s was often provided in an ad
hoc manner or through facilities that served
other purposes. For example, funeral homes
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provided the ambulance service in Texas.
There were several significant changes in the
US beginning in the late 1960s that established
a modern, coordinated EMS effort (BEMTDH
2001):
1.

Advanced trauma (i.e. injury) research,
resulting from the Vietnam War,
demonstrated how well-trained nonphysicians could save lives

2.

Congress passed the EMS Act of 1973

3.

American College of Surgeons developed
a comprehensive emergency prehospital
training program for ambulance attendants

In the last thirty years since modern
EMS began, two critical elements are still
missing from most disaster preparedness
efforts. First, hospitals need to “establish
communications linkages among themselves
and to share information about what resources
are available.” Second, EMS should “deliver
victims to hospitals with resources to meet
their needs” (CWDMG 2003); i.e., evenly
spread the load on the EMS infrastructure.
Mass patient incidents (MPI) and mass
casualty incidents (MCI) stretch the abilities of
EMS in many communities. A MPI (e.g. a
building fire) is distinct from a MCI (e.g. a
hurricane) in scale and scope, but either can be
caused by a wide variety of disasters
(CWDMG 2003). For example, disaster types
include:
•

Natural such as tornadoes

•

Technological as in a building collapse

•

CBNRE which stands for Chemical,
Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, or
Explosive

•

A National Security incident involving
some combination of the above disasters

The largest number of trauma incidents
arises from daily disasters (DD) such as auto
accidents involving small groups. These DD
cause tens of thousands of fatalities and
millions of injuries per year. MPI are much
less common and constitute far fewer deaths
than the DD. MCI are very rare and cause far
fewer total annual trauma deaths than the other
two types. However, MCI have significant
psychological and economic repercussions that
cannot easily be quantified or predicted.

Scenario Technologies: Smart Buildings
Future architecture will include
intelligence in the design aspect of built
structures. This trend is not new (e.g., see
“e/home” product convention), but will take
on new meaning over the next few years. A
smart building will be controlled by ICTI that
enables the stakeholders (e.g. owner, tenant,
utility) to control a variety of environmental
factors. The familiar thermostat concept can be
extended to include all digital activity; e.g.,
appliances reacting to changing inhabitant
behavior such as with schedules. The platform
independent computing allows manufacturers
to open all devices for use in a networked
configuration within the confines of the home
combining domestic engineering and computer
supported cooperative work. Sensors, preset
preferences, motion detectors, and a host of
other devices will be configured to take full
advantage of the structure’s design and
occupants’ habits to achieve stakeholder
objectives.
A common assumption is that the
typical home will have a wide variety of
connectivity with the outside world (e.g.
cellular phones, satellite dishes, DSL, cable
with Internet modems, etc.), but due to brevity
of this paper, the socioeconomic problems
with this assumption will be ignored. Just as
with most infrastructures, the intelligence in
the appliances and structure itself may well
become invisible to the occupants. The
occupant may not know that the utility
company can not only read the smart meter
remotely, but also break down the occupants’
electricity consumption by device. Instead of
merely consuming power, each home will act
as an intelligent node on a national network of
electric power lines (Echelon 2001).
Metropolitan areas with intelligent
structures/nodes scattered throughout the
region will provide a ubiquitous sensor
network that can be integrated into a
Cyberinfrastructure. Faults in the electric
power distribution (i.e. low voltage)
infrastructure are often reported first by private
citizens. However, in the enhanced network of
the future, faults would be reported directly
using the ICTI embedded throughout the
distribution grid and in the homes. This data
can be converted into EMS information. For
example, after seismic sensors detect an
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earthquake, the information could be
triangulated with intelligent home and fault
data utilizing the GPS infrastructure to
immediately indicate the areas suffering the
most damage and in greatest need of EMS.
Another example, in case of a fire, wireless
thermostats and burglar systems could be
designed to cooperatively transmit their
current ambient air temperature, number of
occupants, and occupant location data that
could be rapidly simulated to inform fire
fighters of the fire activity and possible trauma
victims within the building(s).
Intelligent electricity meters and smart
devices using emerging technologies are
already moving the U.S. toward this paradigm.
The associated Cyberinfrastructure design
issues of importance to the EMS community
are intimately tied to social issues as well as
technological aspects. Everyone experienced
with large software system development
understands the difficulty associated with
integration of subsystems or components. A
multilateral Cyberinfrastructure approach to
support EMS will necessitate integration of
extremely large existing Cyberinfrastructure
(e.g. electric power, telecommunications) with
emerging intelligent structure technologies.
The overall “system” state indicates the
current complexion of the domain. A domain
state change event is a key concept from IS
and software design that can be effectively
utilized for Cyberinfrastructure development.
A great deal of meaning can be associated with
state change events if the appropriate event
source data is captured, probabilities can be
assigned to an event, and events can be
triangulated. Utilizing an event notification
infrastructure, existing IS infrastructure such
as DSS or other stand alone tools, once it is
integrated will be more useful to EMS
decision-makers. Each grid state has a specific
set of constraints. In order to react to the
emergency event, the state must be captured
before an emergency or dynamically adapted
to after the event. Interpreting event change
data during an electric power disturbance can
be very precise and proactive because the
utilities have a wealth of domain-specific data
and knowledge workers capable of intuitively
reading the grid. Humans, unfortunately, tend
to examine choices in isolation, maintain too
much rigidity in problem solving, and selfimpose unnecessary constraints (Kleindorfer,
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Kunreuther and Shoemaker 1993). An
appropriately augmented and integrated DSS
can utilize various models, fast statistical
computation, and the entire domain state
change event data to counteract these typical
human restrictions. EMS personnel in the field
or at other nodes on the emergency response
network could have support from centralized
DSS that provide additional decision options
within a Cyberinfrastructure context for
architectural adjustments.
Specific MPI Scenario Event
Most DD, MPI, or MCI will occur
where homes or commercial buildings (but not
necessarily occupants) are present. As these
structures evolve, the computational resources
at each node will grow exponentially. These
resources can be utilized if the appropriate
Cyberinfrastructure is in place. For example,
given the scenario that during a storm a school
bus skids off the road and collides with a
power pole in a suburban or semi-rural area:
1.

The bus’s onboard technologies (e.g.
gyroscope indicating the bus had tipped)
create a state change event. Having
discussed the GTTI phenomenon earlier
on, it is apparent that the appropriate
rescue authorities must be notified and
that the appropriate help must be
dispatched immediately.
a.

b.

The bus company that has relevant
occupant information, such as
i.

Emergency release forms with
contact information

ii.

Average number of occupants

The integrated OnStar™ system
(described earlier) automatically calls
directly to police and fire departments
for assistance.

2.

The accident may be captured on motion
sensitive surveillance equipment for
transmittal to the security company with
live video to monitor for emerging events
such as fire or additional vehicular
involvement

3.

The electric power utility may be able to
use the smart building information (as
well as video feed) to determine the
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4.

probability of a power line being down in
the vicinity to determine level of danger

which may result in your privacy being
invaded.

a.

The utility has experts with
knowledge of electrocution

b.

These utility experts and/or their
DSS can approximate the severity of
burns based on the voltage present,
weather conditions, type of soil, etc.

c.

Hospital ward specializing in burns
could then be put on alert

The smart buildings demonstrate some
of the technological capabilities we currently
have at our disposal. The short MPI scenario
event with some of the possible considerations
was presented to contextualize the analysis
regarding how to apply a method. Although
this scenario has many resources from several
different domains of concern, we will focus on
the electric power to narrow the hypothetical
analysis.
A
full
analysis
of
this
Cyberinfrastructure would not be narrowed,
but encompass all applicable resources. A full
domain analysis facilitates discovery through
stylistic abstraction that would typically be
overlooked in tradition software, information
systems, or systems design efforts.

Weather data gathered from smart
buildings throughout the vicinity must be
factored into the logistical computation to
determine where to transport the MPI
trauma victims based on specific injury
types.
a.

The possibility of helicopter support
can be factored into the calculation
to determine how many trauma
facilities should be considered
accessible

Concrete Constraints

Closed roads and bridges due to
flooding is automatically considered
when dispatching the ambulances

A constraint analysis factors in
expected constraints from all constraint types.
Basically, the designers must methodically
examine all current and near term resources to
determine the broad constraints that will
become applicable to the design. Each set of
constraints adds both limitations and freedoms.

Authorities can automatically access all
of this data in case of an emergency without
the permission of the private companies such
as the bus company or school, so that it can be
triangulated with school medical records.
Parents could theoretically be contacted via
cell phone prior to children arriving at the
facilities to clarify any ambiguities such as
allergies to medication or insurance
discrepancies, which has delayed trauma
treatment in the past. This approach is
expedient, but a major privacy consideration
with societal repercussions. Not only are
personal records accessible, but also utilizing
such technologies as OnStar™, authorities (or
worse, unauthorized or malicious users) can
access your exact whereabouts at any time,
tracking your every movement and even
controlling certain aspects of your vehicle
without your knowledge. For example, home
burglars could know when you were arriving
or car thieves may now be able to easily
unlock your car by simply hacking into your
OnStar™ controller. The OnStar privacy
policy states that they may share your
information with legally authorized persons,

Plant and equipment (e.g. power lines,
breakers) is a concrete resource that is
currently limited in mechanistic functionality.
The future extensibility of these devices for
their utilization as communication network
nodes will effectively remove any and all
telecommunication bandwidth constraints that
may still exist inhibiting an EMS
Cyberinfrastructure. Hardware and low-level
software that can be dynamically reconfigured
in response to a state change event creates new
opportunities, but also raises reliability
concerns due to the increased device
complexity. These developments will coincide
with computer hardware and software resource
developments facilitating smart buildings
becoming nodes on the new network. Smart
buildings can now be configured to operate in
this next generation grid as software resources.
If a device or building is software enabled with
a proprietary technology it will not easily
interface with other devices not utilizing that
same technology creating an additional
constraint. But the device will also more easily
recognize the same proprietary application,
which may provide more degrees of freedom if

b.
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the technology is somewhat ubiquitous.
Intelligent devices are not as easily integrated
(a constraint) into the domain as their
deterministic predecessors because of their
possibility to produce cascading failure.
However, market constraints resulting from
organizational strategy (policy resource) of
competitors will likely change in order to raise
barriers for adoption of proprietary offerings
and slow market penetration. Also, existing
domain-specific electric power market leaders
with proprietary claims will not easily change
standards such as those created through open
source processes (a societal constraint).
Cyberinfrastructure designers will have to
factor in these types of path dependency
considerations
based
on
their
own
understanding as professionals (social resource)
or even governmental policies (e.g., the Justice
Departments
monopoly
case
against
Microsoft).
Security Constraint
Increasing the number of smart devices,
connection or access points, sensornets,
bandwidth, and so forth increases a primary
architectural constraint: security. There is a
direct tradeoff between the ability to observe,
access, sense, and extract data to achieve
security with the level of privacy of those
observed. Measures can be taken to help
facilitate security given data about domain
state changes, but these approaches will
require much research and cooperation from
industry. Even though resources such as a
smart building, a bus, a database, or a hospital
may have the aforementioned technological
features that facilitate integration during an
emergency, it is a stylistic choice as to how
they will be configured.
Software is very vulnerable. The ability
to track activities using software creates
opportunities for hackers to use the same
infrastructure for unlawful pursuits (e.g.,
monitoring police movements). Laws typically
arise from the abuse of freedoms and the
violation of other people’s rights. Of course,
when design constraints are legislated it
forcibly
changes
the
architectural
configuration of the system. The result is a
shift toward centralized authority. Ultimately,
“Big Brother” could legally gather whatever
information it wanted using the EMS enabled
systems and justify the actions under the
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pretense of National Security (Denning 1992).
There are always numerous examples in pop
culture of possible scenarios for abuse of
technology (e.g., film “Enemy of the State”,
1998). Certain stylistic constraints on this
abuse of power would hypothetically work.
For example, smart buildings could only open
access to their data and facilities if a secure,
encrypted signal were detected that was
associated with a domain state change event
directly resulting from a MPI or MCI; i.e.,
validation there was an actual emergency.
However, it is likely with the new security
awareness within funding agencies, there will
be support of a new breed of more secure
programming languages that would still
support platform independence (a key
constraint).
The final decision about what is
secure enough rests with the high-level
architects who depend on security engineers to
plug the holes in the technology. However, a
more difficult problem is how to apply the
security architecture to a Cyberinfrastructure.
Within the CAS framework, the stylistic
constraints for security would likely be applied
after a careful sociopolitical analysis wherein
the results were presented to the architectural
committee for further integration with other
sociotechnical concerns (e.g., human computer
interaction with the devices). Obviously, the
context of these decisions are changing on a
daily basis with emerging terrorist activity,
and must be balanced with the full weight of
the legal system with the appropriate human
rights considerations—by no means a
simplistic constraint.
Three resource views discussed below
have a strong influence upon design:
epistemological distinction between data and
information; formalized and enumerated
resource
ownership,
and;
formalized
Cyberinfrastructure behavior.
Viewing information is distinctly
different than viewing data. There is a data
glut in the world today, but knowledge
workers are still unable to accomplish their
tasks because they lack information that
knowledge warehouses can provide if
constructed (Nemati, Steiger, Iyer and
Herschel 2002). The electric power industry
and other mission-critical infrastructures are
wrestling with a vast amount of domain data
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that
will
theoretically
facilitate
the
advancement of an EMS Cyberinfrastructure.
Depending on the technology available (e.g.,
data or knowledge warehouse) during analysis,
various conclusions can be arrived at because
powerful stakeholders will negotiate based on
what information is presented.
The political aspects of resource
ownership are tightly coupled with the actual
requirements chosen during analysis and
design (Markus 1983; Bergman, King and
Lyytinen 2000). How resource ownership is
formalized, quantified, and presented to
stakeholders as a stylistic view will greatly
impact the ultimate design. For example, if the
smart buildings are shown in a very abstract
format as part of a metropolitan network with
generic data extractions by utilities public
opinion may be in favor of the EMS
Cyberinfrastructure. However, if a lower level
view with very specific data acquisition is
released without an accompanying effective
resource ownership constraint mapping,
individuals may become very hostile to the
design. A strong resource ownership and
service commitment provision should be
utilized to help anchor constraints to
stakeholders, which is part of the problem
definition. Negotiation can proceed regarding
formalized resources with clear commitment
agreements.
Capturing the requirements and
negotiating the resource commitments both
factor into the third stylistic view, which is
Cyberinfrastructure behavior. Every entity, not
just the lower level mechanistic or hardware
devices, in the Cyberinfrastructure has an
associated behavior that can be formalized in
the associated domain of interest (e.g.,
engineering). Legislators (as government
policy resources) would indirectly and directly
constraint software development efforts with
laws and policies. Therefore, views of the
Cyberinfrastructure must be presented in a
manner that transcends constraint type
boundaries in order to eradicate ambiguities
associated
with
misconceptions
and
negotiations between resource owners. For
example, there may be very concise
organizational models of how the hospitals and
schools will behave, in this mini-case an
architect must use a more flexible behavioral
model if an effective Cyberinfrastructure
design is to be presented to all the stakeholders

for viewing. Of course, the specific behavioral
models of any resource must be consistent
with these interdisciplinary behavioral views,
which is a major factor in the CAS integration
framework.
In summary, the high-level system
designers will aggregate the lower level
concrete
constraint
analyses,
stylistic
constraint analyses, and resource views into a
holistic Cyberinfrastructure designs. The more
detailed analyses and views developed by
specialists will benefit the big picture
architectural team working on the EMS
Cyberinfrastructure at a high level.
Juxtaposing these detailed and high-level
perspectives enables the reduction in wicked
problem complexity through architectural
processes proven over centuries in other
professions. The primary aspect of most
design approaches that is ineffective is the
inability to address wicked problems in a
complex domain. The crosscutting effects
create an interwoven web of constraints.
Crosscutting effects from concrete constraints
to stylistic constraints to resource views are
inherently expected to confound design efforts.
A design method developed to work with the
CAS framework will provide guidelines for
software or IS designers to manage the
complexity inherently associated with missioncritical infrastructure and life threatening
situations.

SUMMARY
Current emergency response systems
are built upon customized independent
infrastructures that were developed based upon
traditional IS design theory. However, this
infrastructure has proven insufficient when
large-scale MPI or MCI disasters occur that
require information to be collaboratively
shared among various agencies (e.g., fire, law
enforcement, medical, etc.) and/or missioncritical infrastructure (e.g., electric power,
telecommunications). To highlight this
problem, phenomena including the GTTI were
presented.
The
GTTI
phenomenon
demonstrates how the lack of ICTI augmented
treatment
will
deterministically
and
exponentially increase the probability that the
trauma injury will be fatal. We have
generalized the GTTI phenomenon to all
emergency phenomena in order to examine
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infrastructural evolution using conventional IS
design theories. The general emergency
phenomena exemplified through constraints
such as the inability of professionals to
interface systems when necessary or of the
individual systems being incapable of coping
with unpredictable changes in the environment.
We observed that these types of phenomena
could cause the critical response window of
opportunity (e.g., GTTI) to be largely wasted.
As such we investigate the question; can
technology be used to reduce or destroy the
Golden Barrier associated with the GTTI?
A “Cyberinfrastructure” could be
conceivably assembled in the near future given
the certain technological advancements and
the current level of interest at funding agencies
such as the NSF. However, a technological
deterministic vision of the future is
unwarranted given a myriad of sociotechnical,
sociopolitical, and sociocultural constraints
upon the current emergency response
capabilities. Nevertheless, assuming these
inhibitors can be worked out enough to create
an operational Cyberinfrastructure, a vision
statement was presented wherein we asserted
that emergency response capabilities could be
extended to a nearly omnipresent state of
awareness of the individual citizen. This level
of ubiquitous observation then raises even
more ambiguous and disconcerting issues that
cannot be addressed offhandedly; e.g., the
privacy and freedom of the population being
exchanged for security.
Examining the aforementioned GTTI
and other general phenomena, however,
facilitates the discovery of important
constraints that effect IS success and begins
the discussion of some aspects of the solution
to these problems. Social, technological, and
domain constraints associated with unknown
or uncommon emergency events lead to
complex high-level requirements that combine
to create a “wicked” design problem. We
postulated that the design of a new
Cyberinfrastructure is required to address
these sort of “wicked” problems. In order to
tease apart these constraints, we presented
some initial questions tied to emergency
response
and
the
utilization
of
Cyberinfrastructure based on the vision
statement. Namely, it will be for researchers to
determine if Cyberinfrastructure can be
designed to mitigate Golden Barrier
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phenomena, to overcome the myriad
interacting constraints enumerated throughout
this paper, to have innate awareness of
crosscutting effects arising from domain forces,
and to address the infrastructural complexities
during design.
This paper has suggested that
emergency response systems be designed
within a CAS theoretical framework because
of the need to dynamically evolve IS and
integrate ICTI to conform to the
Cyberinfrastructure objectives. The CAS
framework facilitates the interdisciplinary
research of these “wicked” problems because
it was developed from the integrationist
perspective as a bridge-building theoretical
construct. Therefore, it is ideal as a guiding
construct wherein multiple diverging, but
complimentary
methodologies
can
be
developed to investigate the interaction
between Cyberinfrastructure and the Golden
Barrier in light of broader social concerns. A
simple approach has not and will not provide
the solution to our questions. The CAS
framework has the appropriate constructs to
achieve success, if it is possible. In order to
ground the reader, we presented some
emergency response background information
and a scenario wherein some methodological
speculations could be explored.
We showed how the next generation
Cyberinfrastructure
has
certain
innate
characteristics that can be leveraged with the
architectural metaphor. These relationships
can be used in future research as a means to
reason about Cyberinfrastructure and could be
used to address socially complicated “wicked”
problems. The design process is illustrated by
teasing apart a “smart” building scenario to
demonstrate
the
outlined
approach’s
representational sufficiency for the emergency
response system designs necessary that will
likely be necessary in the future. In doing the
analysis, a number of ethical, moral and social
issues were brought to light.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSION
We conclude that a Cyberinfrastructure
may soon emerge given existing technologies.
Emergency Management System designers can
benefit from it if appropriate theory-based
methodologies can be brought to bear upon the
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“wicked” sociotechnical, sociopolitical or
sociocultural problems common in these
domains. However, as we have shown here,
difficult decisions must be made regarding the
security, privacy, and degree of pervasiveness
we are all willing to tolerate. We outlined
some fundamental questions at the beginning
of the paper. Without extending the current
methodological insights presented here to
conduct specific research, we cannot
unequivocally answer our questions. However,
from a theoretical and analytical perspective, it
is possible to mitigate emergency response
phenomena such as the Golden Barrier in
order to save human lives during the GTTI.
This relationship should hold true in missioncritical infrastructure that suffer from similar
phenomena.
Utilizing the appropriate theoretical
perspectives within the CAS framework will
facilitate the resource/constraint viewpoint to
be explored as we have alluded to in the
scenario. It is important to take a real “life”
cycle stance regarding evolutionary issues
because infrastructure lasts for a very long
time (i.e. continues to live on with us) as
evidenced in the data from the electric power
industry. Other proactive decisions about
logical analysis and design processes must also

be made in order not to be swayed with
technological opportunities or by the
immediate socially construed issues.
Crosscutting domain effects within
CAS can be theoretically described and/or
empirically discovered given the appropriate
perspective and access to data. For example,
through broad empirically grounded and
theoretically substantiated systemic design
approaches such as those referenced in this
paper, society can hope to grapple with the
complexities of Cyberinfrastructure design.
We believe attacking these complexities
squarely
with
appropriate
theoretical
perspectives will guide researchers to effective
methodological approaches that can be used to
mitigate emergency response phenomena such
as those arising during the GTTI. Therefore,
we do have a possibility of mollifying
complexities that are growing at an
exponential rate, which correlates with
society’s increasing dependence on ICTI.
However, incorrectly designing, evolving, and
depending on future technologies such as
Cyberinfrastructure to address emergencies
will likely push issues of complexity even
further out of our reach—we must take care to
insure that the “cure does not kill the patient”.
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